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THE U.S. SUPREME COURT AND THE ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
CASES: RECASTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
SHERRI BURR"
I first began speaking and writing about the Alvarez-Machain cases in 1999.1 As
someone who taught public international law, I became interested in the 1990 kidnapping of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain from his office in Guadalajara, Mexico.
Dr. Alvarez-Machain's capture was arranged by agents of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (D.E.A.). These agents hired Mexican nationals to
transport him to El Paso, Texas, where he was transferred to U.S. officials to stand
trial for participating in the alleged torture and killing of D.E.A. agent Enrique
Camarena. As the case made its way up to the U.S. Supreme Court, it possessed
potential to impact the fragile international legal system that formulates customary
law based on a process of claims and counterclaims.
In 1992 when the original Alvarez-Machain case reached the U.S. Supreme
Court, Kenneth Starr was the first Bush Administration's Solicitor General. Starr
argued that the Federal Government had the right to kidnap foreigners and prosecute
them in the United States for crimes committed abroad. Additionally, Starr
contended that the extradition treaty between the United States and Mexico was
merely a "tool" that does not limit the Government's freedom to use other means to
pursue "narco-traffickers." 2
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed. In his majority decision, Chief Justice Rehnquist
declared that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's kidnapping did not deprive U.S. courts ofjurisdiction because the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty was silent on the issue of
kidnapping.3 Rehnquist maintained that since the treaty did not forbid kidnapping,
it was permissible.4
This decision was greeted with laughter, among other reactions. Professor Tom
Franck of New York University contends there is a "laughter test" in international
law. If a nation puts forth a justification for an action before the world community
and the response is laughter, then the action is illegal. Over the years, as I discussed
the case in my classes and with colleagues, students and professors alike routinely
laughed.

* Sherri Burr is a Dickason Professor of the University of New Mexico School of Law, 1117 Stanford NE,
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87131. Telephone 505-277-5650 Email: Burr@law.unm.edu.
Burr received her A.B. (Politics) from Mount Holyoke College, her M.P.A (International Relations) from Princeton's
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, and her J.D. from Yale Law School. She is the author
of numerous law review articles and the following three books: Art Law: Cases and Materials(William S. Hein
& Co. 2004) with DuBoff and Murray; EntertainmentLaw: Cases and Materials in Film, Television, and Music
(ThomsonWest 2004) with Henslee; and Entertainment Law in a Nutshell (ThomsonWest 2004). Her article on
Protecting Business Secrets in National and International Commerce, published in the peer-reviewed Science
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1. Throughout the year 2000, I gave speeches in Mexico at ITESM in Chihuahua, in San Juan at the
University of Puerto Rico, in South Africa at the University of the Western Cape, in Spain at the University of
Granada Law School, and in the United States at the University of Denver and at Yale Law School.
2. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Case on Right of US. to Kidnap Foreigners,N.Y. TIMES, Apr.22,
1992, at D22.
3. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666 (1992).
4. Id. at 670.
5. Sherri Burr, From Noriega to Pinochet: Is There an InternationalMoral and Legal Right to Kidnap
Individuals Accused of GrossHuman Rights Violations?,29 DEN. J.INT'L L. & POLICY 101, 102 n.9 (Spring 2001).
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Among the other responses that greeted the decision was alarm. I was among
those expressing apprehension. The U.S. Supreme Court's decision represented a
dangerous precedent, both for the international community and for U.S. citizens.6
Since customary international law develops through a process of claims and
counterclaims, other countries could counterclaim the right to kidnap U.S. citizens
as a tool to fight an important social issue.
Indeed, when we fast-forward to 2004, we find that there have been over 100 kidnappings in the Iraq and Persian Gulf areas by groups seeking to influence U. S.
policy. Some of these kidnappings have had dire endings as U.S. citizens have been
killed and beheaded. While none of these terrorists have cited the Alvarez-Machain
case as a justification for their actions, the case was covered by the news media
throughout the world and it became well known that the U.S. Government believes
kidnapping is an appropriate tool to reach its goals.
After the U.S. Supreme Court declared that Dr. Alvarez-Machain could be tried,
the district court judge dismissed the charges, stating they were based on the
"wildest speculation.", 7 The district judge granted Dr. Alvarez-Machain's motion for
a judgment of acquittal on the ground that the government had failed to present
sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict.8
Dr. Alvarez-Machain returned to Mexico and began the civil action against the
U.S. Government that led to another U.S. Supreme Court decision during the
summer of 2004. The doctor sued Jos6 Francisco Sosa, Antonio Garate-Bustamante,
five unnamed Mexican citizens, the United States government, and four D.E.A.
agents. Dr. Alvarez-Machain sought damages against the United States for false
arrest under the Federal Tort Claims Act (F.T.C.A). 9 He sued Sosa and other
individuals
for participating in his kidnapping under the Alien Tort Statute
(A.T.S.).' °
The F.T.C.A. permits individuals to sue the U.S. Government for personal injury
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any government employee
while acting within the scope of his office or employment. Pursuant to the A.T.S.,
U.S. district courts are given original jurisdiction over any civil action by an alien
for a tort committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States. Here, the District Court dismissed the F.T.C.A. claim, and awarded summary
judgment and $25,000 in damages on the A.T.S. claim." The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the A.T.S. judgment, but reversed the dismissal of the F.T.C.A. claim. 2 Sitting en
banc, the full Ninth Circuit affirmed. 3 The Ninth Circuit cited a "clear and
universally recognized norm prohibiting arbitrary arrest and detention" to support

6. Id.; See also Sherri L. Burr, DE NORIEGA A PINOCHET: iHay un derecho internacional,moral o
juridico, al secuestro de individuos acusados de graves violaciones de los derechos humanos?, 3' REVISTA DE LA
FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD DE GRANADA, 3' 6poca, Num. 5 (2002).
7. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 2003).
8. Id.
9. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2747 (2004).
10. Id.
11. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, No. CV 93-4072, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23304, at *78 (C.D. Cal.
June 29, 2004).

12. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001).
13. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 643 (9th Cir. 2003).
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its conclusion that Dr. Alvarez-Machain's arrest amounted to a tort

in vinvotion -f

international law.14

Reversing the Ninth Circuit's en banc decision in 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court
ruled that Dr. Alvarez-Machain was not entitled to a remedy under either the
F.T.C.A. or the A.T.S. 15 The U.S. Supreme Court has been consistent in its actions
towards the doctor. The U.S. Government not only had the right to kidnap him, but
also could refuse to pay him any remedies.
F.T.C.A. CLAIMS

AGAINST THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

While the F.T.C.A. does waive the Government's immunity from suit in certain
situations, it does not waive governmental immunity of the United States for claims
arising in a foreign country. This is known as the "Foreign Country Exception."' 6
In its decision, the Ninth Circuit proclaimed a headquarters exception to the
"Foreign Country Exception." For an act to be deemed headquartered in the United
States, U.S. employees and officials must have caused damage while in a foreign
country, or caused actions to take place within the foreign country. 7 This would
seem to apply to Dr. Alvarez-Machain's situation because employees of the U.S.
Government planned his abduction from Mexico. Furthermore, he incurred damage
in Mexico that was caused by people operating in the United States.
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, dismissed the headquarters exception because
it postulated that it would become easy to assert that the negligent activity that
injured a plaintiff abroad was the consequence of faulty training, selection or
supervision within the United States. It speculated that just about anything could be
repackaged as a headquarters claim."
Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court said Dr. Alvarez-Machain's claim arose from
harm proximately caused by acts in Mexico, although the planning took place in
California.' 9 In other words, how do you define the kidnapping of Dr. AlvarezMachain? Did it take place in Mexico where he was initially abducted, or did it
begin and end in the United States where it was initially planned and to where he
was eventually transferred?
This gives rise to an interesting debate between the Ninth Circuit, which said the
tort was headquartered in California (where the planning and direction took place),
and the U.S. Supreme Court, which said the crime took place in Mexico (on foreign
soil). As the highest judicial body, the U.S. Supreme Court had the final say on the
matter.
The U.S. Supreme Court also noted that when the F.T.C.A. was passed, the
general rule was that a cause of action arising in another jurisdiction which was
barred in that jurisdiction was also banned in the United States.2 ° The F.T.C.A.
employed the principle lex loci delicti: the law of the place where the injury

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. at 620.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 2754 (2004).
28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1994).
Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1054 (9th Cir. 2001).
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2749.
Id.at 2750.
Id.
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occurred. In this case, Mexican law should apply. However, the court concluded that
"current flexibility in choice of law methodology gives no assurance against
applying foreign substantive law if federal courts follow headquarters doctrine to
assume jurisdiction over tort claims against the Government for foreign harm.'
Moreover, the court opined that the headquarters doctrine would result in a
substantial number of cases applying the exact foreign law the foreign country
exception was meant to avoid.2 2 In other words, the Government would become
liable under a foreign country's laws.
A.T.S. CLAIMS AGAINST Joslt FRANcIscO SOSA AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS
Adopted into the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Alien Tort Statute is one of the
country's oldest laws. The A.T.S. states simply that "[t]he district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the laws of nations or a treaty of the United States."23
In dismissing Dr. Alvarez-Machain's claims under the A.T.S., the U.S. Supreme
Court said that the act must be interpreted according to historical precedent. In other
words, application of the A.T.S. must be limited to the founding fathers' perceptions
of international law when they drafted the statute.24
For the U.S. Supreme Court, the A.T.S. is ajurisdictional statute creating no new
causes of action. The reasonable inference from the historical materials is that the
statute was intended to have practical effect the moment it became law. Only a
modest number of international law violations had the potential for personal liability
at the time the statute was written. The U.S. Supreme Court cited three specific
offenses that were prevalent under the law of nations at the time: (1) violations of
safe conducts, (2) infringement of the rights of ambassadors; and (3) piracy. 25 The
U.S. Supreme Court said that this narrow set of infractions of the law of nations was
on the minds of the men who drafted the A.T.S.26 Because of this, the court reasoned
the A.T.S. applies only to these types of violations.27
Thus, under this interpretation, claims based on present-day law of nations must
rest on "a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the eighteenth century paradigms recognized., 28 The U.S. Supreme Court would thus narrowly limit federal
courts' recognition of private claims under federal common law exclusively to violations of international norms accepted in 1789.
What is astonishing about this outcome is that the U.S. Supreme Court has never
limited its own application of laws to their historical paradigm. In Bush v. Gore, for
example, the U.S. Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to stop the
recount of votes in the Florida presidential election. 29 The Fourteenth Amendment

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.at 2753.
Id.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2754.
Id. at 2756.
Id.
Id. at 2761.
Id. at 2761-62.
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-106 (2000).
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was enacted to guarantee equal rights to newly freed slaves. Had the U.S. Supreme
Court limited the Fourteenth Amendment to its nineteenth century paradigm, it
would not have been able to apply it to a twenty-first century problem, i.e., modem
methods of counting votes. Indeed, if it had, it would have used the Fourteenth
Amendment to demand a full recount of all the votes to insure that each person be
given a voice in selecting the U.S. President.
In conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court has embarked on incongruous interpretations of international law. By limiting the A.T.S. to its historical paradigm, the
U.S. Supreme Court fails to accord international law the opportunity to grow and
develop into a vibrant body of norms. At the same time, the Court has shown its
own inconsistency by restraining some laws to their historical paradigm but failing
to restrict others.

